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Composite charging games in networks of electric
vehicles
Olivier Beaude, Cheng Wan, and Samson Lasaulce
Abstract—An important scenario for smart grids which encom-
pass distributed electrical networks is given by the simultaneous
presence of aggregators and individual consumers. In this work,
an aggregator is seen as an entity (a coalition) which is able to
manage jointly the energy demand of a large group of consumers
or users. More precisely, the demand consists in charging an
electrical vehicle (EV) battery. The way the EVs user charge
their batteries matters since it strongly impacts the network,
especially the distribution network costs (e.g., in terms of Joule
losses or transformer ageing). Since the charging policy is chosen
by the users or the aggregators, the charging problem is naturally
distributed. It turns out that one of the tools suited to tackle this
heterogenous scenario has been introduced only recently namely,
through the notion of composite games. This paper exploits for
the first time in the literature of smart grids the notion of
composite game and equilibrium. By assuming a rectangular
charging profile for an EV, a composite equilibrium analysis
is conducted, followed by a detailed analysis of a case study
which assumes three possible charging periods or time-slots.
Both the provided analytical and numerical results allow one to
better understand the relationship between the size (which is a
measure) of the coalition and the network sum-cost. In particular,
a social dilemma, a situation where everybody prefers unilaterally
defecting to cooperating, while the consequence is the worst for
all, is exhibited.
Index Terms—EV charging - Electrical Distribution Networks
- Composite game - Composite Equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
EV charging can lead to significant impacts on the exist-
ing and future energy networks [1, 2]. Considering different
physical metrics, the smart grid literature pursued the goal
to mitigate these impacts optimizing EV charging schedules
using Demand Side Management [3], proposing charging
algorithms [4, 5] or pricing policies [6, 7].
The EV charging problem can be seen as a distributed
problem. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that EV’s owners
can decide when they plug their vehicles and how they charge
their batteries. As a consequence, game theoretical tools have
been proposed to tackle the charging problem (see e.g., [8]
for a recent survey). Very relevant contributions include [6, 9–
11]. On the contrary, it may also be assumed that the charging
profiles of the EVs are decided by a coordinator, often called
aggregator [6, 12], who is much more informed about the
real constraints of the electrical network. In this case, the
decision is centralized and optimization tools are used to
find the optimal policy. The present work deals with the
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situation in between, when a fraction of the EVs is supposed to
independently decide their charging policies, while the rest is
governed by an aggregator. This framework has been recently
introduced in the game theoretic literature [13] with the notion
of composite equilibrium and, to the best of our knowledge,
our work is the first to propose an application of this concept
to the EV charging problem, or more generally to a smart grid
issue.
The contributions of this paper include
• the formulation of the EV charging problem as a com-
posite game,
• the characterization and proof of existence of its equilib-
rium,
• the description of its main properties in the particular case
of three time-slots,
• the numerical analysis of these properties in the case of
distribution network costs.
The paper is structured as follows. Sec. II provides the
model of composite games in the context of EV charging.
Sec. III defines and characterizes the composite equilibrium.
Sec. IV treats a particular case, and conducts an equilibrium
analysis. A thorough numerical analysis is then provided in
Sec. V and the paper is concluded by Sec. VI.
Notations. Bold symbols stand for vectors. For all d ∈ N∗,
∆d = {z = (zi)
d
i=1 ∈ R
d|z ≥ 0,
∑d
i=1 zi = 1}; for all
D > 0, ∆dD = {z = (zi)
d
i=1 ∈ R
d|z ≥ 0,
∑d
i=1 zi = D}.
For all m,n ∈ N such that m ≤ n, Jm,nK = {m,m +
1, . . . , n− 1, n}.
For x = (x1, x2, ..., xd),x′ = (x′1, x′2, ..., x′d) ∈ Rd,
〈x,x′〉 =
∑d
i=1 xix
′
i denotes the inner product of x and x′.
II. COMPOSITE EV CHARGING GAME
A. EV charging game
There are T time-slots, labeled by t ∈ T = {1, 2, . . . , T }.
We consider a set of EVs which have to choose C consecutive
time-slots, C ≤ T , to charge. Each EV is considered as a
player, i.e. aims to minimize his charging cost taking into
account the impact of the other EVs’ charging decisions using
the framework of Game Theory [14]. The assumption of
choosing consecutive time-slots is mathematically restrictive1
and thus provides a less general mathematical structure than
with freely varying charging vectors [15]. It is nonetheless
1Indeed, the charging vector is only defined by the time to start charging
while a more general case would be to consider charging vectors in the T−1-
dimensional simplex.
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very important to mitigate impact of the charging policy on the
battery lifetime because highly time varying charging currents
can increase battery temperature much more and lead to a
shorter lifetime [16].
B. Composite game
In this paper, we consider EVs as nonatomic players who
have weight zero and who are called individuals. Nonatomic
means that an EV alone cannot have an impact on the cost
perceived by other players. This holds in particular when there
is a large number of EVs. A group of individuals of positive
total weight form a coalition if the behaviour of its members is
coordinated by an aggregator [6]. A charging game with both
nonatomic players and coalitions is called a composite game
[13] and its equilibria are called composite ones accordingly.
This corresponds to the practical situation where some of EVs
decide their charging policies independently, while the others
are coordinated by one or several aggregators. Without loss of
generality, the total weight of all the EVs is assumed to be 1.
C. Charging flows definition
We suppose that there are K coalitions. For any coalition k
of size Mk > 0 (1 ≤ k ≤ K), let xkt denote the weight of the
EVs sent by it to start charging at time t ∈ J1, T−C+1K. Thus
the vector xk = (xkt )T−C+1t=1 ∈ F k = ∆
T−C+1
Mk
characterizes
the strategy, or charging flow, of coalition k.
For t ∈ J1, T K, let ykt denote the quantity of EVs from
coalition k charging at time t, and define yk = (ykt )Tt=1. It is
called the charging load induced by its strategy xk. Indeed,
ykt =
t∑
s=max(t−C+1,1)
xks , ∀ 1 ≤ t ≤ T . (1)
Let Fˆ k be the set of charging loads of coalition k induced
by its strategies. It is not difficult to verify that Fˆ k is a convex
and compact subset of RT .
For the individuals of total weight M0 ≥ 0 (M0 = 1 −∑K
k=1M
k), let x0t be the weight of the individuals starting
charging at time t ∈ J1, T−C+1K. Define x0 = (x0t )T−C+1t=1 ∈
F 0 = ∆T−C+1
M0
, which can be viewed as the strategy profile
of the individuals.
Let y0 be the charging load induced by x0 and Fˆ 0 the set
of charging loads induced by the strategies of the individuals.
Finally, let x = (xi)Ki=0 ∈ F = F 0×F 1×· · ·×FK denote
the strategy profile of all the players and y = (yi)Ki=0 be the
system charging load. Denote Fˆ = Fˆ 0 × Fˆ 1 × · · · × FˆK the
set of feasible system charging loads.
The total weight of EVs charging at time t is denoted by
zt :=
K∑
k=0
ykt . (2)
Define the aggregate charging load as z = (zt)Tt=1.
D. Cost definition
Let us now introduce the (per unit) charging cost function at
each time-slot, f . If there are EVs of total weight zt charging
at time t, then the charging cost for each of them is f(Lt+Pzt)
during that time-slot, where
• L = (Lt)
T
t=1 is the non-EV load, assumed to be known;
• P the total EV charging power in the district, i.e. the
number of EVs in the district multiplied by the charging
rate of an EV assumed constant between EVs here for
simplicity2;
• and f is a real-valued function defined on [0,W ] for W
sufficiently large, i.e. bigger than the potential maximal
load in the district.
This expresses the fact that EV charging cost depends on
the impact measured in the elctrical network, which is one of
the main ideas of smart grids. Notice that f is common for
all the EVs.
Assumption 1. The charging cost function f is of class C1,
convex, strictly increasing and nonnegative on [0,W ].
Assumption 1 always holds in this paper.
For an individual EV, the charging strategy consists in
charging from time-slot t to time-slot t+ C − 1 (t ∈ J1, T −
C + 1K), and its cost function is
ut(x) =
t+C−1∑
s=t
f(Ls+Pzs), ∀x ∈ F, ∀ 1 ≤ t ≤ T −C+1 ,
(3)
where the dependency between x and z is implicit in the
notations and comes from (1) and (2). The average cost to
coalition k can be written as a function of x
Πk(x) =
1
Mk
T−C+1∑
t=1
xkt ut(x) , (4)
or as a function of y
Πˆk(y) =
1
Mk
T∑
t=1
ykt f(Lt + Pzt) . (5)
The average cost to the individuals can be similarly defined
as a function of flow x, denoted by Π0, or as a function of
load y, denoted by Πˆ0.
Finally, the social cost is function of y
Π(y) =
T∑
t=1
zt f(Lt + Pzt) , (6)
where, again, the dependancy between z and y is implicit in
the notations.
Let this (composite EV) charging game be denoted by
G(T,C, f, (M i)Ki=0).
2Typically 3kW in the residential case.
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E. Application to distribution network costs
In the context of residential distribution networks (the
system which delivers power from the generation points to the
end users, see [1] for an illustration), two particular classes of
physical cost functions f will be considered:
• Joule losses, which is a quadratic one: f(Lt + Pzt) =
(Lt + Pzt)
2 [4];
• equipment ageing (transformers for example), which can
be approximated by an exponential function (when the
transformer power is close to its nominal level) [2]:
f(Lt + Pzt) = exp[β(Lt + Pzt)], with β > 0.
Note that the standard "mathematical" linear case will also
be studied, which corresponds to a standard approximation
of practical applications. Observe that Assumption 1 holds in
these three cases and also when considering a weighted sum
of these objectives.
III. DEFINITION AND CHARACTERIZATION OF COMPOSITE
EQUILIBRIUM
We are now interested in defining and characterizing a
configuration of equilibrium at which neither the individuals
nor the coalitions have incentive to deviate from their current
strategy.
A. Composite equilibrium conditions
At equilibrium, if strategy t is used by individuals, i.e. x0t >
0, then
ut(x) ≤ us(x), ∀s ∈ {1, 2, ..., T − C + 1} , (7)
according to the standard Wardrop equilibrium conditions [17].
Notice that in this case the cost of all the individuals is
common and equal to the average cost Π0.
At equilibrium, a coalition k minimizes the average cost of
its members3, given the strategies of the other coalitions and
individuals:
Πk(xk,x−k) = min
x
′k∈Fk
Πk(x′k,x−k) (8)
where x−k = (xi)0≤i≤K, i6=k denotes the strategies of other
players than coalition k.
Definition III.1. In a composite charging game
G(T,C, f, (M i)Ki=0), a configuration x ∈ F is a composite
equilibrium (CE) if conditions (7) and (8) are satisfied.
Composite equilibria can also be characterized via varia-
tional inequalities. Denote the gradient of coalition k’s cost
w.r.t. its strategy (or flow) xk by
Uk(xk,x−k) := ∇
x
kΠk(xk,x−k). (9)
Define also U0(x) = Π0(x) and let U = (U i)Ki=0.
At the minimum, the first order (necessary) condition of
the minimization problem (8) is
∀x˜k ∈ F k,
〈
Uk(xk,x−k), x˜k − xk
〉
≥ 0. (10)
3This is obviously equivalent to minimizing the total cost of its members.
Proposition III.2. If for all coalition k, Πk(xk,x−k) is
convex with respect to xk on F k for all x−k ∈ F−k, then
x∗ ∈ F is a composite equilibrium if and only if
〈
U0(x∗0,x∗−0),x0 − x∗0
〉
≥ 0, ∀x0 ∈ F 0,〈
Uk(x∗k,x∗−k),xk − x∗k
〉
≥ 0, ∀xk ∈ F k, ∀ k = 1, . . . ,K ,
which is equivalent to
〈U(x∗),x− x∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ F . (11)
Proof: The proof is similar to the one of Prop. 1 in [13].
It can be shown that the necessary and sufficient condition
(11) remains the same if the cost function f undergoes an
affine transformation f 7−→ af + b with a > 0, b ∈ R. In
turn, x∗ is a composite equilibrium of G(T,C, f, (Mk)Kk=0)
if and only if it is a composite equilibrium of G(T,C, f +
b, (M i)Ki=0) (or G(T,C, af, (M i)Ki=0) for a > 0). This is why
the simulations at the end of this paper are restricted to the
case f(Lt + Pzt) = (Lt + Pzt)
2 in the quadratic case and
f(Lt + Pzt) = Lt + Pzt in the linear case.
With formulation (11), the existence of an equilibrium in
the charging game G(T,C, f, (Mk)Kk=0) is easily obtained.
Theorem III.3. If for all coalition k, Πk(xk,x−k) is convex
with respect to xk on F k for all x−k ∈ F−k, then the charging
game G(T,C, f, (Mk)Kk=0) has a composite equilibrium.
Proof: Because of the continuity of f , U is continuous
on the compact and convex set F . The variational inequality
(11) thus has a solution [18]. Given Prop. III.2, this (eventually
these) solution(s) is (are) a composite equilibrium(s).
We also have an important property concerning the com-
parison between the cost of individuals, the average cost in a
coalition and the social cost. Indeed, by the definition of CE,
individuals choose the least expensive alternative(s) at the CE,
therefore one obtains the following general result immediately.
Proposition III.4. At a composite equilibrium,
Π0(M) ≤ Π(M) ≤ Πk(M), ∀M ∈ (0, 1], ∀k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
(12)
IV. PARTICULAR CASE OF THREE TIME-SLOTS
In this section, the properties of composite equilibrium are
studied for a charging game G(T,C, f, (M i)Ki=0) with T = 3
time-slots, a charging duration C = 2, a unique coalition of
size M ∈ (0, 1] and a group of individuals of total weight
1−M . This corresponds to a situation where there are a peak,
an off-peak and a standard time-slot. This also suits the case
of charging places where EVs do not stay a long time, e.g. a
parking. Indeed, because the charging rate will not vary with
a small time step, this leads to situations where the number
of time periods considered is very small. Finally, this is a first
step to determine some intuitive theoretical results that could
be then observed by simulations of cases with a bigger number
of time-slots.
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A. Notations of this particular case
An EV has two alternatives:
• alternative 1: charging at t = 1 and t = 2;
• alternative 2: charging at t = 2 and t = 3.
For the individuals, these are just their strategies. In the
coalition, the aggregator assigns an alternative to each EV.
Time indexes are omitted to simplify the notations. Let
x1 (resp. M − x1) denote the weight of EV to which the
aggregator assigns alternative 1 (resp. alternative 2), and x0
(resp. 1 − M − x0) the weight of the individuals choosing
alternative 1 (resp. alternative 2). Therefore, x1 ∈ [0,M ],
x0 ∈ [0, 1−M ], and they respectively characterize the strategy
of the coalition and the choices of the individuals. To simplify
the notations, we set here P = 1 without changing the
essential nature of the results provided here4. Since all the
EVs are charging at time-slot t = 2, the per-unit cost for this
time-slot, f(1 + L2), is common to all the EVs. Thus, we
simply need to study the following costs


Π˜0 = Π0 − f(1 + L2)
Π˜1 = Π1 − f(1 + L2)
Π˜ = Π− f(1 + L2)
. (13)
Considering the choice made by the coalition, Π˜1 is a
function of (x0, x1), defined on [0, 1]2:
Π˜1(x0, x1) =
x1f(L1 + x
1 + x0) + (M − x1)f(L3 + 1− x
1 − x0)
M
.
For example, in the Joule losses case, f(L) = L2,
Π˜1(x0, x1) =
x1(L1 + x
1 + x0)2 + (M − x1)(L3 + 1− x
1 − x0)2
M
.
B. Configuration of composite equilibrium
Without loss of generality, suppose that L1 ≥ L3. This
means that the cost of the first time-slot (resp. alternative 1)
is higher than that of the third time-slot (resp. alternative 2)
without EV charging.
The explicit computation of the CE x∗ using the conditions
(7) and (8) is omitted. We summarize the results here. Observe
that the individuals’ common cost, Π0, the coalition’s average
cost, Π1, and the social cost Π are the key variables for
analyzing the efficiency of the CE.
a) Case 1: L1 ≥ L3 + 1:
• For M ∈ (0, f(L1)−f(1+L3)
f ′(1+L3)
] (or M ∈ (0, 1] if
f(L1)−f(1+L3)
f ′(1+L3)
≥ 1)
x∗1 = 0, x∗0 = 0 (14)
Π˜ = Π˜0 = Π˜1 = f(1 + L3) (15)
4This can be done without loss of generality because this is equivalent to
scaling L.
• For M ∈ ( f(L1)−f(1+L3)
f ′(1+L3)
, 1] (possible only if
f(L1)−f(1+L3)
f ′(1+L3)
< 1)


0 < x∗1 < M :
f(L1 + x
∗1) + x∗1f ′(L1 + x
∗1)
= f(1 + L3 − x
∗1) + (M − x∗1)f ′(1 + L3 − x
∗1)
x∗0 = 0.
(16)

Π˜ = x∗1f(L1 + x
∗1) + (1 − x∗1)f(1 + L3 − x
∗1)
Π˜0 = f(1 + L3 − x
∗1)
Π˜1 = 1
M
[
x∗1f(L1 + x
∗1) + (M − x∗1)f(1 + L3 − x
∗1)
]
(17)
b) Case 2: L3 ≤ L1 < L3 + 1:
• For M < 1 + L3 − L1(≤ 1)
x∗1 =
M
2
, x∗0 =
1 + L3 − L1 −M
2
(18)
Π˜ = Π˜0 = Π˜1 = f
(1 + L1 + L3
2
) (19)
• For M ≥ 1 + L3 − L1(> 0)


1+L3−L1
2 < x
∗1 < M2 :
f(L1 + x
∗1) + x∗1f ′(L1 + x
∗1)
= f(1 + L3 − x
∗1) + (M − x∗1)f ′(1 + L3 − x
∗1)
x∗0 = 0
(20)

Π˜ = x∗1f(L1 + x
∗1) + (1 − x∗1)f(1 + L3 − x
∗1)
Π˜0 = f(1 + L3 − x
∗1)
Π˜1 = 1
M
[
x∗1f(L1 + x
∗1) + (M − x∗1)f(1 + L3 − x
∗1)
]
(21)
C. Properties of composite equilibrium
Using the configuration of the CE obtained previously, its
main properties, namely existence, uniqueness, and variation
with the size of the coalition, are now investigated.
Proposition IV.1. For all M ∈ (0, 1], there exists a unique
composite equilibrium (x∗0, x∗1).
Proof: The existence results from Thm. III.3 given that
Assumption 1 holds. The uniqueness directly follows from the
summary of the results given just before.
Observe also that the individuals’ weight on the first al-
ternative at CE is independent of the charging cost function
verifying Assumption 1.
Since the equilibrium (x∗0, x∗1) is unique for each coalition
size M ∈ (0, 1], one can now consider the following quantities
as functions of M and omit the superscript ∗: the quantity of
EV charging from t = 1 in the coalition, x1, the quantity
of individuals taking strategy 1, x0, the individuals’ common
cost, Π0, the coalition’s average cost Π1, and the social cost,
Π.
Additional properties of the CE configuration
(x0(M), x1(M)) can be deduced easily from the results in
Section IV-B. To this end, an additional hypothesis on the
charging cost function will be needed.
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Assumption 2. Charging cost function f is of class C2 on
[0,W ].
Proposition IV.2. Under Assumption 2, function x1 is contin-
uous and increasing in M on (0, 1]. More precisely,
1) if L1 ≥ L3 + 1 and f(L1)−f(1+L3)f ′(1+L3) ≥ 1, then x1 is
constant on (0, 1];
2) if L1 ≥ L3+1 and f(L1)−f(1+L3)f ′(1+L3) < 1, then x1 is con-
stant on (0, f(L1)−f(1+L3)
f ′(1+L3)
] and it is strictly increasing
in M on ( f(L1)−f(1+L3)
f ′(1+L3)
, 1];
3) if L3 ≤ L1 < L3 + 1, then x1 is strictly increasing in
M on (0, 1].
Proof: Both the continuity of x1 on (0, 1] and the mono-
tonicity are obtained by using the implicit function theorem
on the equations characterizing x1.
The proofs of the following results of this paper, which are
also based on the application of the implicit function theorem,
are omitted. Considering the weight of individuals using
strategy 1, a similar result, but with the opposite monotonicity,
is obtained.
Proposition IV.3. Function x0 is continuous and decreasing
in M on (0, 1]. More precisely,
1) if L1 ≥ L3 + 1, then x0 is constant (x0 = 0) on (0, 1];
2) if L3 ≤ L1 < L3 + 1, then x0 is strictly (linearly)
decreasing in M on (0, 1+L3−L1) and it is constant
(x0 = 0) on [1 + L3 − L1, 1].
An intuitive interpretation of Prop.IV.2 and Prop.IV.3 is as
follows. The bigger the coalition, the more EV it puts on the
more expensive charging alternative, and the less individuals
who choose the more expensive alternative. This highlights
that bigger coalitions integrate more externalities. When the
coalition is of size one, this leads to the social optimum.
The following proposition now characterizes the convexity
of the EV put on strategy t = 1 at equilibrium, x1.
Proposition IV.4. If f is linear x 7→ x, quadratic x 7→ x2, or
exponential x 7→ eβx (β > 0), then function x1 is concave in
M on (0, 1].
This proposition expresses a phenomenon of saturation.
Although the coalition puts more EVs on the more expensive
alternative when its size increases, the additional weight on
this alternative decreases with respect to its size. Note that
some properties for the function x1 such as its linearity or strict
concavity are available for some choices of the parameters L1
and L3 as for Prop. IV.2.
D. Cost at the composite equilibrium
First of all, according to (14), (16), (18) and (20), the
continuity of x0 and x1 leads to that of Π0, Π1 and Π on
their domains of definition. In particular, (16) and (18) show
that Π0 can be extended to M = 1 in a continuous way. Thus,
one has the following corollary of Prop. IV.2.
Corollary IV.5. Under Assumption 2, the individual’s cost
Π0, the average cost of the coalition Π1, and the social cost
Π at the CE are continuous in M on (0, 1].
After this technical property, two issues arise to better
understand the influence of the coalition on the costs:
1) comparison between the cost of individuals, the average
cost in the coalition and the social cost;
2) analysis of the monotonicity of these costs with respect
to the size of the coalition M .
Concerning the first issue, the answer is given in the general
case by Prop. III.4: the cost of individuals is smaller than the
social cost which is itself smaller than the average cost in the
coalition. Let us now focus on the impact of the size of the
coalition on Π0, Π, and Π1. This is of primary interest for a
social planner who tries to analyze the cost of the different
entities under its supervision and to decide if it is worthwhile
to encourage the formation of coalitions.
Proposition IV.6. Under Assumption 2, the individual’s cost
Π0, the average cost of the coalition Π1, and the social cost
Π at the CE are decreasing in the size of the coalition M .
The previous proposition shows that the bigger the coalition
is, the better it is for everyone. However, considering Prop.
III.4, this leads to a "social dilemma", a situation in which
collective interests are at odds with private interests. Indeed,
the social optimum is attained when the coalition is global, i.e.
M = 1; meanwhile, according to Prop. III.4, each EV prefers
to act individually, leading to M = 0. This phenomenon is
similar to the one studied in [13]. Designing incentives to
encourage EV to join the coalition could constitute a relevant
extension of this work.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Quantifying the results of the particular case T = 3, C = 2
We first investigate the particular case T = 3, C = 2. The
non-EV load is supposed of the form L = (L1, 1, 1) with
L1 ≥ 1 representing the load at peak time of other electrical
consumptions, P = 1, and β = 1 when the exponential
charging cost function f is considered. In turn, this provides
a thorough application of the theoretical framework presented
in the previous part. The CE configuration is thus directly
given, by (14) for example, or calculated by solving implicit
equations, (16) for example. The variation of the configuration
of the CE and that of the equilibrium costs associated will
be analyzed and quantified according to the charging cost
function f and the size of the coalition M .
Fig. 1 and 2 present the weight x1 put by the coalition on
alternative 1 for the three standard charging cost functions:
linear, quadratic, and exponential. As theoretically claimed,
when L1 ≥ L3+1 (cf. Fig. 1), x1 is zero for small values of
M , and it becomes positive from different thresholds of M for
different metrics f . When L1 < L3 + 1 (cf. Fig. 2), x1 is the
same for all the metrics f up to a common threshold M¯ = 1+
L3−L1, after which x1 is different for different metrics. Also,
one observes that x1 is greater when L1 is relatively lower or,
equivalently, when time-slot 1 is relatively less expensive. Take
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the linear cost metric as example. Fixing L3 = 1, if L1 = 2.3
(Fig. 1), x1 remains 0 till M = 0.3 then it increases linearly
to 0.18 when M = 1; while if L1 = 1.5 (Fig. 2), x1 increases
in a piecewise linear manner from 0 to 0.37 while M varies
from 0 to 1.
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Fig. 1. Configuration of CE according to the size of the coalition M for
L1 = 2.3 ≥ L3+1: the individuals do not use the most expensive alternative
t = 1− 2.
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Fig. 2. Configuration of CE according to the size of the coalition M for
L3 ≤ L1 = 1.5 < L3 + 1.
Next, the cost of CE is analyzed in the case of an expo-
nential or quadratic charging cost function. Fig. 3 presents the
different normalized costs, i.e. the costs divided by the social
cost at M = 0. It shows the ranking between individual,
coalitional and social costs and their monotonicity. It also
quantifies the social benefit realized with respect to the size of
the coalition. In the quadratic case, for example, a small gain
of approximately 3% is made with a coalition of size M = 1
in comparison with the case with only individuals (M = 0).
However, in the situation of a global coalition (M = 1), this
figure also shows that any EV deviating to schedule alone its
charging policy will do a significant benefit of 0.97−0.880.97 ≈ 9%.
This highlights that the configuration with a coalition of size
one is very efficient but also very unstable in the sense that
each individual EV has a great interest to quit the coalition.
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Fig. 3. Individual, coalitional and social cost at CE for a quadratic or
exponential charging cost function and L1 = 1.5 < L3 + 1.
B. A first step towards larger dimensions
As one would expect, determining the CE of a game is rather
complicated. Even for some given charging cost function f
and for small instances, it may be impossible to give the
explicit form of the equilibrium configuration analytically.
Consequently, it is of interest to see whether there are simple
and distributed learning schemes that allow players to arrive at
a reasonably stable solution. One of these schemes is based on
an exponential learning behavior where players play the game
repeatedly and learn the best strategies by keeping record of
their strategies’ performance (see [19]). At each step denoted
by index n, the individuals update their cumulative cost for
strategy t, V 0,(n)t , as
V
0,(n)
t = V
0,(n−1)
t + ut(x
(n−1)) , (22)
where x(n−1) = (x0,(n−1),x1,(n−1)) is the strategy profile
of all the players at the (n − 1)th iteration of the dynamics.
These cumulative costs reinforce the perceived success of each
strategy as measured by the average payoff it yields. Hence,
the players will lean towards the strategy with the smallest
cumulative cost. The precise way in which this is done is by
playing according to the exponential law:
x
0,(n)
t =
e−V
0,(n)
t
∑T−C+1
s=1 e
−V
0,(n)
s
. (23)
Similarly, the coalition updates its cumulative cost V 1,(n)t
for strategy t replacing ut(x(n−1)) by ∇x1Π1(x(n−1)) in (22)
and its weights according to (23) with V 1,(n)t instead of V 0,(n)t .
When players update their cumulative costs in continuous
time, we obtain the standard replicator dynamics [19]. In-
terestingly, this dynamics has been shown to converge5 for
5Furthermore, if the convergence point is an interior point, it is a composite
equilibrium.
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composite games in the case of linear cost functions [20].
First, this dynamics has been tested on the simple cases
analyzed in Sec. V-A and we find the same results as the
ones obtained with the analytical formula, not only for the
linear case for which it is theoretically proven but also for the
quadratic and exponential cases. This is of primary interest for
practical applications and also leads to the open problem of
the convergence in the quadratic and exponential cases.
Then, we propose a first realistic application studying
the EV charging during the night time in a district with
T = 7 considering a two hours time step; t = 1 corre-
sponds to 5pm − 7pm, t = 2 to 7pm − 9pm, ..., t = 7
to 5am − 7am the next day. The sequence of non-EV
loads is a normalized version of the global consumption
profile in France for the aforementioned period of time;
the data are available on the RTE website "http://clients.rte-
france.com/lang/fr/visiteurs/vie/courbes.jsp". The other param-
eters are set to C = 3 and P = 0.2 which corresponds to the
case where EVs need to charge until 75% of their battery
capacities6 and a penetration rate of approximately 40%7.
Finally, the linear charging cost function f(L) = L, for which
convergence of the replicator dynamics holds, is considered.
We first observe the total load during the considered night, as
the sum of the non-EV load, the individual nonatomic charging
load and the coalition charging load. It can be observed that
while individuals charge mainly during the night when the
non-EV load is small, coalition’s load is more uniformly
distributed.
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Fig. 4. Total load at a CE for EV night charging (T = 7 > 3) with a linear
charging cost function f(L) = L: individuals’ load is put on the "valley" of
the non-EV load, coalition’s load is more uniformly distributed.
The two following figures are dedicated to study if the main
theoretical properties established in the particular case of three
time-slots are still observed when considering this larger case.
Fig. 5 (respectively Fig. 6) shows that the monotonicity
6A full charging of a battery of 24kWh at 3kW needs 8hours.
7Given that the maximal household electricity consumption is typically of
6kW and the EV charging rate at home of 3kW, the ratio 0.2/3
1/6
= 0.4
approximates the EV penetration rate in the district under the assumption that
all houses consumes at their full contracted power at peak time.
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Fig. 5. Configuration of CE for EV night charging (T = 7 > 3) with a linear
charging cost function f(L) = L according to the size of the coalition M :
the monotonicity properties theoretically established for T = 3 and C = 2
still seem to hold.
properties of the charging weights (respectively costs) at CE
proven in the case T = 3, C = 2 still seem to hold: a
next step of this work will be to confirm these observations
with theoretical arguments. Finally, this again exhibits the
phenomenon of "social dilemma".
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Fig. 6. Individual, coalitional and social costs at a CE for EV night charging
(T = 7 > 3) with a linear charging cost function f(L) = L according to the
size of the coalition M : the monotonicity properties theoretically established
for T = 3 and C = 2 still seem to hold.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce the game-theoretical framework
of composite games as a tool to analyze the situation where
both autonomous EVs and coalitions of EVs, i.e., groups of
EVs which are coordinated by a unique aggregator, coexist
when taking their charging decisions. In this context, the
existence of a stable configuration, a composite equilibrium,
is proven to exist. At equilibrium, the cost of individuals, the
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average cost in the coalition, and the social cost have been
compared.
Then, more detailed properties of the composite equilibrium
are established in the illustrative case of three time-slots as a
first step to validate some intuitions. In particular, it is shown
that the charging weights on the time-slot with the largest
non-EV demand/load increases with the coalition size for the
coalition, while it decreases for the individuals. This highlights
the different behaviour of the individuals and the coalition,
expressing in particular that larger coalitions integrate more
externalities. Furthermore, all the costs are proven to decrease
with the size of the coalition supporting the idea of forming
big coalitions for EV charging but leading also to a standard
“social dilemma”: The social optimum is obtained for a
coalition of maximal size but then each EV prefers to act
individually. A relevant extension of this work would be to
design incentives to make the configuration with a coalition
of maximal size stable.
Finally, simulations both quantify these phenomena in the
simple case of three time-slots and are also conducted in the
realistic case of EV night charging with a larger number of
time-slots. Interestingly, the theoretical results proven in the
case of three time slots seem to hold in the simulation realized
in this latter case: this shows that there is still room for
improving the understanding of the properties of this problem
in a general setting. The framework of composite games seems
to be particularly promising for understanding heterogenous
distributed networks such as smart grids.
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